Recent studies of physician pricing have pointed to the difficulty of developing a satisfactory theory of physician price determination. Wliile much thought has been given to the various special characteristics of the market for medical services (for example, see references 2, 5, 8, 9, 11, and 12), no single theory incorporates all the implications of such char acteristics. In addition, much of the limited empirical work on physician pricing fails to either support or reject proposed models having a priori appeal. For example, Newhouse constructed monopolistic and competitive models of physician pricing and attempted to demonstrate that his empirical results support the hypothesis that the market for physicians' services is monopolistic [13] . However, in a comment on the Newhouse study, Freeh and Ginsberg demonstrated that Newhouse's empirical findings could not distinguish between monopolistic and competitive pricing under standard profit maximization assumptions [6] .
In addition, much of the limited empirical work on physician pricing fails to either support or reject proposed nradels having a priori appeal. For example, Newhouse constructed monopolistic and competitive models of physician pricing and attempted to demonstrate that his empirical results support the hypothesis that the market for physicians' services is monopolistic [13] . However, in a comment on the Newhouse study, Freeh and Ginsberg demonstrated that Newhouse's empirical findings could not distin guish between monopolistic and con^etitive pricing under standard profitmaximization assumptions [6] .
In a 197A article, Steinwald and Sloan attempted to use the empirical results of a study of the determinants of physician fees to provide some insight into the appropriateness of various theories of physician pricing [14] .
Included among the theories considered were: competitive and monopoly profit maximization; utility maximization; pricing to achieve a target income; non-price rationing (i.e., pricing to maintain permanent excess demand in order to allow physicians some discretion to select the most medically
Interesting cases); and markup pricing. The empirical results lead to ten tative rejection of the models of markup pricing and non-price rationing and indicate that the target-income model may also be less appropriate than some previous studies suggested. The authors conclude by supporting con tinued usage of "standard" profit-maximization models [14, 510- The following section discusses the nature of the model used, specific hypotheses concerning the determinants of physician pricing, and descriptions of the variables employed. Section III presents and discusses the empirical results, and the final section summarizes the insights gained by the statis tical analysis.
II MODEL, HYPOTHESES'AND VARIABLE MEASUREMENT
The characteristics of the market for physicians' services preclude application of both the model of perfect competition and that of pure monopoly; instead, a model of imperfect competition is appropriate. As
Fuchs and Kramer point out, "With respect to physicians' services, the imperfections of competition are numerous and powerful. On the supply side, these include the restrictions on entry created by licensure and professional control of medical education, the limitations on practice implicit in the hospital appointment system, and the absence of price cutting, advertising, and other forms of rivalry. As for demand, the difficulty consumers experience in judging the qual ity of physicians' services is well knowri, and it is thought by some that the physician plays a major role in determining the quantity of services to be provided" [7, 1] .
The model of physician pricing used in this study assumes that each physician faces a downward sloping demand curve for his services, thereby providing the physician some monopolistic ability to set price and quantity.
Multiple linear regression analysis is used to establish the significance of a wide range of variables hypothesized to influence the price a physician ) charges for his services. The independent variables are grouped into four categories: physician characteristics, demographic characteristics, structural characteristics, and costs of producing medical care. The depen dent variable used for each medical procedure is the average price a physician charges a patient of middle income in the absence of complications.Â . Physician Characteristics
Degree of specialization
The degree of specialization of the physician is hypothesized to have a positive effect on price, since the more specialized a physician is, the higher the quality of service he should be capable of rendering to his patients, especially in the provision of those procedures that are included in his specialty.
>
The 5th Periodic Survey of Physicians requested that each physician indicate the specialty area of medicine from which he derives 50% or more of his medical income. With the use of dummy variables each physician in the samples was classified according to whether he is a general practitioner, a specialist in the specialty field of medicine that is most closely identified with the procedure in question, or a specialist in another specialty. For both procedures studied, the base for the dummy variables measuring specialization is general practice.
The coefficient for "primary specialty" (PSP) indicates the fee differ ence between general practitioners and those physicians who received 50% or more of their medical income from the specialty that typically performs the procedure in question. For the obstetrical care procedure, the relevant primary specialty is Obstetrics and Gynecology; for the appendectomy procedure, Surgery was selected as the relevant primary specialty. The coefficient of the second specialty dummy variable, "other specialty" (OSP) indicates the price difference between general practitioners and physicians who are specialists in a specialty other than that chosen as the relevant primary specialty.
Thus, a positive relationship is expected between primary spe cialty (PSP) and price and between other specialty (OSP) and price.
In addition, it is hypothesized that the size of the coefficient of PSP will be larger than that of OSP; this follows from the assumption that a specialist performing a procedure that is not included in his specialty will produce (or at least will be perceived by patients as producing) a service of lower quality than the relevant specialist who is better trained to perform the procedure in question,2 A dummy variable (SX) having a value of 1 for female physicians and 0 for male physicians is utilized to test the effect on price of the sex of the physician. Thus, 'the hypothesis is that the coefficient of SX will be negative, indicating that, ceteris paribus, women receive lower fees than do male physicians. In addition, the size of the fee differ ential can be used as an indication of the extent of discrimination against women physicians.
B. Demographic Characteristics
The demographic factors included in the empirical investigation are per capita income, population per physician and the degree of urbanization; all three are with respect to the geographic area in-which the physician practices medicine. These demographic factors' primarily reflect the demand side of the market for the services of physicians and can be interpreted as causing shifts in the demand curves facing the individual physicians. However, they may be considered to be supply determinants as well, in that physicians may choose the geographic locations of their practices in response to such demographic factors.
Per capita income
The A smaller geographic area than states was preferrable; in particular, the county or city in which the physician practices were preferred geographic divisions. However, the AMA data set identified physicians only by state, thereby necessitating the use of the imperfect state per capita income measure. and physicians who practice medicine in counties with populations in the range of 50,000 to 1,000,000. Similarly, the coefficient' of the large-sized geographic area (LG) indicates the price difference between physicians in the base-sized geographic area and physicians who prac tice medicine in counties with populations greater than 1,000,000.
C. Structural Characteristics of the Production Unit
Two variables that together partially describe the structure of the unit in which the physician produces his services are source of income and type of practice.
Source of professional income
Source of professional income refers to the basis on which a physician receives his Income. Specifically, it refers to whether he is paid for the services he performs on a salary basis or on a fee-for-service basis or some combination of the two.
Organized medicine has promoted the use of the fee-for-service principle and has argued that only such an income principle will main tain a high quality of service. However, the real impetus for prefer ring fee-for-service over salary arrangements may be to maintain the high level of prices for physician services. When the fee-for-service basis is used, the physician's income is more directly related to the prices charged patients and the physician has a greater personal incentive to control the use of such pricing policies as price discrim ination. One can' tentatively hypothesize that the more a physician gets away from the use of straight fee-for-service, the lower will be the price charged.
The AMA data set categorizes physicians according to their relative usage of the fee-for-service principle as the basis for determining physician.income, Fee-for-service only is the base used for the follow ing three dummy variables that measure the source of professional income:
F/S -fee-for-service primarily, but some salary S/F -salary primarily, but some fee-forrservice S -salary only Thus, to lend support to the AMA's traditional argument for usage of the fee-for-service principle, the empirical results should show that each of the above three dummy variables has a negative effect on price and that the absolute value of the coefficient of each successive variable is larger than the previous one, as compared to the base of fee-for-service only After reviewing the results of the initial regressions, the empirical investigation proceeded by including in subsequent price equations those variables that were statistically significant or approached such significance in the initial regressions. Thus, the regression equations in Table 3 include only those variables that were statistically significant price determinants for at least one of the two procedures tested. Tables 1 and 2 respectively present the means and standard deviations and the correlation matrices for these variables.
[
INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 HERE]
The statistically significant determinants of physicians' fees for the two procedures are especially easy to compare since the means of the prices of the two procedures are very close; the mean fee for the appendectomy procedure is $198.04, while the mean for the obstetrical care procedure is $199.50.
[INSERT than does a general practitioner. For both procedures the physicians primary specialty (PSP) was always positive as hypothesized and statis tically significant at the 99% level. However, primary specialty has a more substantial effect on price (more than three times the dollar amount)
for the obstetrical care procedure than for the appendecton^procedure.
This may be due to the nature of the.procedures themselves. Surely patients requiring the obstetrical care procedure have a good indication of the cause of their medical problem (namely, pregnancy) at the time they select a physician; it should be obvious to the patient which type of specialist performs the warranted medical services. However, this is not likely to be the common situation with respect to the appendectomy procedure, in. which case the early sjmiptoms do not provide the patient a clear indication of what specialty of physician is most appropriate.
As a result, obstetricians and gynecologists may have a larger degree of monopoly power with respect to the obstetrical care procedure than do surgeons with respect to the appendectomy procedure.
The empirical results for OSP (other specialty) are somewhat mixed.
As hypothesized, the sign of OSP was always positive and the magnitude of the coefficient of OSP was less than that of PSP; however, while OSP was typically statistically significant at "the 95% level in the obstetrical care equations, it was not a significant determinant of the appendectomy fee.
Years of experience
As discussed earlier, the three highly correlated measures of the physician's length of experience were tested separately. ' The three measures were YRS^(years since graduation from medical school), YRS( years in specialty), and YRS^(years in specialty, excluding residency).
In the price equations for both procedures tested, none of the three measures of experience was ever statistically significant, not even at the 90% level, and the signs of the coefficients varied in no systematic pattern. Such non-significant results are not surprising since, as discussed previously, the amount of experience possessed by a physician may lead to several effects that influence price in opposing directions.
The Steinwald and Sloan study (using similar AMA data for 1970-71) included three dummy variables measuring the age and/or experience of the physician and also found the signs of the coefficients to vary and to seldom attain statistical significance [14, [506] [507] ].
Physician sex'
The hypothesized existence of sex descrimination on the part of patients in selecting physicians and the resulting negative effect on fee received by female physicians is supported by the statistical results obtained in the regression equations for both procedures tested.
Ceteris paribus, being a woman physician reduces the fee received for an appendectoihy by more than $53. For the appendectomy procedure, the sex variable has the largest coefficient of any of the independent variables and is statistically significant at the 99% level. Being a woman physician also reduces the price charged for the obstetrical care procedure; however, the size of the sex coefficient is substantially
smaller (approximately $15) than it is in the appendectony regression equation and is statistically significant at only the 90% level. In all regression equations that included P/P, the coefficient was always negative and statistically significant at the 99% level. As discussed earlier, theory predicts that, in the absence of excess demand, the sign will be positive; however, if excess demand prevails, population per physician is not expected to have a significant effect on price. The only theory consistent with the negative and significant coefficients obtained is that physicians price in order to achieve a target income.
Because P/P is based on county size group codes, the negative corre-✓ lation coefficients between P/P and LG are relatively high (see Table 2 ), due to this, the regression equations presented in Table 3 include equations where P/P and the two variables measuring the degree of urban ization (MED and LG) were used separately as well as together. While the coefficients of P/P varied somewhat, the direction and degree of statistical significance of P/P remained the same.
One might be tempted to discount the results obtained for the population per physician variable due to the poor measure used. However, it should be noted that Newhouse found the same unexpected sign; a 
Degree of urbanization
Because the same nine county size group code variables were used to construct both the two dummy variables measuring the degree of urbanization and the population per physician variable, the regression results presented in Table 3 include equations containing both these constructed variables principle is necessary to maintain high quality of medical service.
Type of practice
The results indicate that the type of practice a physician is engaged in (solo, partnership or group) does not affect prices charged. For both procedures, the coefficients of PRT and GRP varied in sign and were never statistically significant price determinants. These results are similar to those found in the Steinwald and Sloan study which also used dummy variables to represent different practice sizes (solo, 2-5 MD's and more than 5 MD's) [14, 505] .
D. Costs of Producing Medical Care
As hypothesized, the effect of total expenses (EXP) was always positive and statistically significant at the 99% level.
When the components of total expenses were tested, the following patterns emerged. For both procedures, malpractice insurance was consistently For the appendectomy procedure, rent and non-medical professional expenses (legal, accounting, etc.) were also positive and typically signifi cant at the 997o level; for the obstetrical care procedure these two cost components had positive signs.but were only significant at the 90% level. All other expense components were not statistically significant for both procedures and carried signs that varied in no systematic pattern, with the exceptions that employees' wages and salaries, professional car, and drugs and medical supplies were consistently negative.
IV SUMMARY
This study has sought to identify and statistically test some of the determinants of physician pricing; these potential determinants were grouped into four categories: physician characteristics, demographic characteristics, structural characteristics of the production unit, and costs of producing medical care. The effects of these variables were tested via multiple linear regression analysis using individual physician data for two medical procedures, appendectomy and obstetrical care.
The empirical results indicate that both supply and demand variables have substantial impacts on physician fees. Among the physician character istics, the degree of specialization and the sex of the physician were found to be inq^ortant price determinants; however, the number of years of experience of the physician does not appear to influence price. All the variables tested that describe the area in which the physician practices were found to affect the fee charged. As expected, both the per capita income and the degree of urbanization generally had positive effects on price. However, population per physician was found to have a significant negative effect on price; this support for the target income theory of physician pricing.
Neither of the sets of variables describing the structure of the physician's practice (source of professional income and type of practice)
"was found to significantly or consistently influence price.
Finally, the analysis indicates that the level of total expenses incurred in providing medical care has a positive and significant effect on fee, as does the malpractice insurance cost component. 1. Some returned questionnaires were eliminated from consideration because they either lacked complete or consistent answers or were returned by physicians who were retired or engaged in federal service.
2. The obstetrical care procedure includes antepartum care, obstetrical delivery and postpartum care (with or without low forcepts, and for episiotomy).
3. The obstetrical care and appendectomy procedures were selected primarily for their uniformity; other possible procedures (such as initial office visit or follow-up hospital visit) were not selected because it was assumed that the fees for these would vary greatly among patients with.
different "special circumstances", and therefore only a small part of their total price variation could be explained by the variables for which data was available.
4. Measuring the dependent variable by the average price a physician charges a patient of middle income may introduce a bias since physicians' ideas of what constitutes middle income may vary among physicians. Measuring price in this manner was presumably undertaken in an attempt to arrive at a single price for every procedure each physician performs. However, it is often assumed that at least some physicians engage in price dis crimination according to the patient's ability-to-pay. 5 . Although it would have been desirable to include specialty board certification as a measure of the quality of the physician's degree of specialization, the data set did not allow this. However, since most patients are probably more likely to be aware of a physician's specialty than his certification status in the specialty, lack of board certification data may not be important. But for those procedures (such as surgical ones)
where the choice of the physician to perform the procedure is likely to be based to some degree on another physician's referral, the certification status of the physician may be expected to a more important determinant of the demand for a physician and consequently the price of his services;
this, of course, is the case only if physicians do consider specialty board certification in making referral recommendations. 6 . No data was available to measure the extent to which experienced physicians keep informed of new medical knowledge by attending professional meetings, reading medical journals, and so forth. Similarly, no data was available to measure the quality of the physician's services by the medical school attended or by the physician's class ranking while attending medical school or during the internship or residency programs.
7. For three recent surveys indicating that patients, as a whole, prefer male to female physicians, see references 4, 10 and 16.
8. However, while income is often an appropriate measure-of a person'ŝ^i lity-to-pay, the extent of an individual's medical insurance coverage is often a better measure, especially for those procedures typically covered by major medical insurance. Nevertheless, measuring ability-topay by income may still be appropriate if an individual's medical insurance coverage is positively related to his income level.
9. The nine categories of county population are as follows. Non-metropolitan:
less than 10,000; 10,000-24,999; 25,000-49,999; and 50,000 or more. Metro politan: potential metropolitan; 50,000-499,999; 500,000-999,999;
1,000,000-4,999,999; and 5,000,000 or more.
10. The same holds for total expenses and its components, and, to a lesser degree for population per physician and degree of urbanization. 27 11.
For further discussion of those results, see reference 1.
12. Newhouse also found a partial correlation coefficient of +.13 between dental prices and the number of dentists per person [13, 178] ,
